How Soviet Propaganda Weaponized Ballet

While ballet is most commonly associated with Swan Lake and Sugar Plum Fairies, during the Cold War it was an important Soviet tool for cultural diplomacy, projecting ideological strength on a global scale. From the 1950s, the Soviet Union utilized its ballet companies as cultural diplomats, molding Western perceptions of the USSR and supporting its projection as a superpower.

Joseph Nye’s conception of “soft power” outlines how a nation’s ability to influence other actors through culture, values, and diplomatic efforts, may be just as coercive as traditional military power. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union utilized ballet as an ideal means for exercising this “soft power” influence. The Soviet government strategically deployed dance companies such as the Moiseyev Dance Company and the Bolshoi Ballet on world tours. The emphasis placed upon these dancers and performances served as a testament to the Soviet regime’s recognition of the role of art, even from the times of the Russian Empire, in conquering hearts as well as minds. 

After the death of Stalin in 1953, the Khrushchev thaw that followed introduced major cultural exchanges with the West, allowing for groundbreaking dance tours to Paris in 1954, and London in 1956. These Soviet “ballet tours” were carefully orchestrated to advance strategic political goals, as the Soviet government sought to showcase its cultural and intellectual sophistication. The French and British audiences were dazzled by the athleticism and emotional depth of the Soviet dancers, surpassing those found in Western ballet of the time.

These ballet dancers came to be portrayed as the embodiment of the “New Soviet man” and “New Soviet woman”—strong, disciplined and united. As such, ballet was transformed into a medium for Soviet propaganda, blending artistry with ideological messaging. Additionally, the Soviet Union was a multi-ethnic state, and its leadership used ballet to attempt to foster a sense of a unified Soviet identity. As a part of this the Soviet government invested heavily in cultural institutions, including ballet schools and companies, across the fifteen Soviet republics.

National dance troupes, such as the Moiseyev Company, were encouraged to celebrate the diverse cultures of the USSR’s republics. Yet, at the same time, the Soviet regime promoted a centralized, homogenized vision of Soviet culture, often rooted in Russian traditions. Ballet, originally imported from France and refined under the time of Imperial Russia, became closely associated with the concept of the “Russian soul.” This cultural Russification was both a strength and a limitation, as it elevated Soviet ballet on the global stage while ultimately marginalizing regional artistic expressions. 

In the United States, Soviet ballet’s debut came under the Lacy-Zarubin Agreement, which promoted cultural exchanges between the two superpower nations.  In particular, the Soviet leadership aimed to counter existing American narratives of the USSR, instead presenting a nation that valued and produced high culture and inter-ethnic harmony. The Bolshoi Ballet’s 1959 tour was a resounding success, drawing hundreds of thousands of Americans to its performances across major US cities.

While the Bolshoi Ballet captivated elite audiences in major Western cities, the Moiseyev Dance Company’s tour presented a broader vision of Soviet identity.  This folk dance-inspired ensemble emphasized the cultural diversity of the USSR, incorporating dances from the Soviet Union’s many republics. Its choreographic program highlighted Tatar, Belarusian, and Ukrainian dances, among others, thus demonstrating Soviet political narratives of inter-ethnic harmony under the overarching socialist framework. American audiences were struck by the vivid portrayal of a multicultural Soviet identity, comparing it favorably to the American “melting pot” experience. As such, the Moiseyev’s success was a triumph for Soviet cultural diplomacy, softening perceptions of the USSR as a monolithic and repressive state.

Despite its success as a cultural weapon, Soviet ballet was not immune to controversy, as performances held underlying statements of political and cultural dominance.  High-profile defections by star dancers undermined the USSR’s carefully cultivated “soft power” project. The defection of Rudolf Nureyev in 1961 and Mikhail Baryshnikov in 1974 became headline-grabbing events, illustrating the repression and lack of artistic freedom within the Soviet Union. For Western audiences, these defections provided compelling stories of individual courage and resistance. The dancers who fled the USSR often became minor celebrities, offering glimpses of life behind the Iron Curtain.

Their firsthand stories highlighted the Soviet Union’s contradictions of championing its cultural achievements while curtailing individual freedoms. These narratives not only tarnished the USSR’s cultural image but also provided the West with potent propaganda for the ideological battle of the Cold War. For the Soviet leadership, these defections were both an embarrassment and a direct challenge to their narrative. Efforts to prevent dancers’ defections included strict surveillance by KGB agents during tours outside of the USSR. Yet, the allure of Western freedom and opportunities often proved too strong for some of the USSR’s most talented artists to resist.