Amidst steppes far, far away was built a sumptuous city, whose walls and monuments, adorned with rich mosaics, stand fiercely before the ardent sun as one of the last vestiges of an era long gone – Samarkand. Leagues away, up in the north, in a place called Baikonur, monstrous steel structures defy the firmament as they rise up high, sweeping the land with fire…
Central Asia is not a region we hear much about, though it is the cradle of many wonders. For centuries, stopovers were erected there along the Silk Road, hosting voyagers, traders or emissaries (just like the legendary Marco Polo) travelling back and forth between two worlds, Medieval Europe and the Chinese Empire. Central Asia saw nomad cultures become Empires, Genghis Khan lead the Mongols to victory; it saw Islamic cultures flourishing with science and wisdom. Even much later, when the Russians entered the region in the nineteenth century, Central Asia became a key asset for the Soviet Union, offering immense resources for the Cold War and steppes perfectly fitted for space launches.
Central Asia, a place of many desires
Then came 1991. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan became independent Republics; but peace was not found easily. Domestic troubles arose amid demands for democratization, multiethnic heritages, boundary conflicts and Islamist-driven terrorism – partly due to their turbulent neighbour, Afghanistan.
The Soviet era might be over, yet the region still arouses the great powers’ appetites. Beyond its strategic location as a sort of buffer between West and East, it is first and foremost the abundance of its natural resources that attracts diplomats and investors. The local giant, Kazakhstan (the world’s ninth largest country, around half the region’s GDP in 2024), is the premier uranium producer worldwide, a prominent actor in oil and gas production (followed by Turkmenistan), and possesses considerable reserves of lithium, rare earths and other metals indispensable for green transition technologies. Despite the political legacy of the Soviet Union (i.e. autocratic traits and unachieved liberalization), the region’s growth rate is dynamic and frequently approaches two digits.

Although the bipolar order has fallen, competing influences still spread around the region. Despite Russia’s attempt to maintain a guardianship over its former territories, namely through the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the aftermath of the USSR’s dissolution, the regional leaders seem to strive for new pathways. However, let’s not pretend that Moscow isn’t an important actor anymore: the Russians still own shares in gas and oil companies and remain top-rank economic partners.
Nonetheless, as the bear faded away, the dragon knocked on the door. The appearance of three new countries at China’s westernmost border enabled great opportunities. Chinese industrial overcapacity craved for foreign outputs, and Central Asia for investment in infrastructure: hence the deal was sealed. Chinese entry began with the co-creation, alongside Russia, of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a regional organization for political, economic and defence cooperation. Yet quite quickly, the dragon outpaced the weary bear with a brilliant announcement.
The New Silk Road, or the beginning of a larger power shift
Astana, Kazakhstan, 2013. China’s new President, Xi Jinping, announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an economic policy directly inspired from the ancient times of the Book of Wonders, when Polo described the magnificence of the Chinese Empire, a superpower overtaking Europe in both iron and gold. The aim was ambitious: Xi not only wanted to recreate a modern Silk Road along the old one – assembling railways and highways from China to Europe – but also to create a reinforced maritime belt that could secure Chinese exports through strategic ports along the Indian Ocean.
And beyond all geostrategic considerations – that is to say, the start of the economic struggle between Washington and Beijing for the top of the podium – the fact that President Xi chose Kazakhstan as the place where he first articulated his vision of the Belt and Road Initiative was particularly interesting, prefiguring a new era for Chinese influence in the region.

In his book China’s Asian Dream: Empire Building along the New Silk Road, the journalist and analyst Tom Miller documented Beijing’s two-way strategy of infrastructure diplomacy. Mainly through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and state-owned enterprises, China invested billions and billions of dollars into building better connections in Central Asia (transportation, telecommunications, etc.), hence developing the region while preparing the BRI project – a win-win situation, supposedly. Following the speech, the stakeholders’ offensive was not long away: state-owned companies acquired shares in Kazakh oil, gas and mining companies, oftentimes at the expense of their Russian counterparts. In 2018, the Chinese state-owned oil company CNPC already controlled one fourth of national oil production.
Nursultan Nazarbayev, former Kazakh President, praised a “multivectorial policy” that fortified the country’s autonomy (especially from Russia, though it is not said explicitly) while helping China with diversifying its supply in raw materials, key for the manufacturing industry. Moscow timidly tried to take the lead with the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union between Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia, yet it appeared that Beijing’s dominance had grown faster: in two decades, the value of all economic exchanges between Central Asia and China had increased forty-fold.
Uncertainty, a profitable business?
Miller’s takeaway is noteworthy: “China’s ‘march westwards’ has drawn far less attention than the US’s ‘pivot to Asia’, but it may prove more significant.” Beijing’s ambition has long been underestimated by the West; and while the relationship with Washington worsens day by day and war rages again on European soil, the European Union finally awakens. As uncertainty expands, threatening economic supply and the resilience of globalized, fragmented supply chains, derisking has become a trendy keyword. The trade ban on Moscow since the 2022 invasion forced the Old Continent to diversify its supply in oil and gas, so diplomatic initiatives flourished in Central Asia to secure deals.
Europe may even appear to be a third-way choice for the region. On the one hand, the European Commission seeks diversification for critical raw materials, key to green transition and defence industries and currently highly reliant on Chinese imports––materials whose reserves in the region are underexploited. On the other hand, although Beijing’s influence has fostered economic development, some fear a new form of dependence and eagerly welcome third-parties initiatives to reduce their reliance on an asymmetric trade relationship with China. Furthermore, Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine was poorly welcomed in a region long dominated by Soviet imperialism: Kazakhstan declared neutrality, shifting away from Russia.
Uncertainty is a profitable business. The world might face a new Thucydides’ trap, where Washington seeks to defend by all means the remains of its power before Beijing, timidly followed by Brussels who reflects upon its own strategic autonomy. Yet in the meantime, economic interests flourish, and so does Central Asia.
↓ Image Attributions
[1]: “Endpunkt der transkaspischen Eisenbahn in Turkmenbaschy” by Bohndorf Film-Team // Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0
[2]: “Qarmet Combine in Temirtau (2019-02-16)” by Ilya Varlamov // Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0
[3]: “After Russian-Chinese talks” by The Russian Presidential Press and Information Office // Licensed under CC BY 4.0