Is Reza Pahlavi interested in being a democrat, or just a King?

In the power vacuum that has followed as a result of the joint U.S-Israeli aerial campaigns against Iran and the weakened position of the Islamic regime, several domestic and international actors are considering the prospect of influential leadership positions within the post-war government.

Among the numerous political and religious orientations of the opposition, one individual stands out for his decades-long struggle to ascend the throne as the Shah of Iran and continue his father’s legacy: Reza Pahlavi. Born as the eldest son of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and his third wife, Empress Farah, during the reign of the Pahlavi Dynasty, Reza Pahlavi Jr. was raised as an heir apparent.

But when the monarchy was overthrown by the Ayatollah in 1979 following a long period of social unrest, the noble house went into exile. After his father’s death just a year later, Reza Pahlavi proclaimed himself to be the rightful heir to the throne, devoting his life to a dissident struggle against the theocratic republic that Iran had become. None of the family members have set foot in their homeland since then.

Until recently there wasn’t much media attention regarding Reza Pahlavi. That is, until the American war against Iran started and President Donald Trump publicly stated that it was now up to the Iranians themselves to seize the opportunity at hand to depose the Ayatollah and establish a new government of their choosing: “When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be, probably, your only chance for generations.”

The American president seemed reluctant to suggest any specific alternatives to the Islamic regime, instead only focusing on getting rid of the current leadership. This strategy may have been used to avoid having to escalate the conflict with a boots-on-the-ground approach, something which would be detrimental for his political support at home. The choice of only weakening the Islamic regime without offering a viable solution as to who should replace it seems to have been based on the assumption that the Iranian opposition would be united enough to form a new government without external aid.

On paper – and without considering ethical factors – this way of conducting a regime-changing operation may sound reasonable. From Trumps perspective, aerial bombardments without sending soldiers into harm’s way would allow for the U.S to dispose of one of its major foreign adversaries by creating the conditions necessary for the Iranian people to do the lions share themselves, which in turn would allow the Americans to avoid mass-casualties among its own troops.

At the time of writing, however, the war is still ongoing after several weeks of heavy bombing from both sides, and though it has now settled into a stalemate and a mutual blockade, there remains no end in sight. The Ayatollahs have yet to be toppled – even though a new supreme leader has been instated since Ali Khamenei was killed in the initial phase of the war – and the opposition hasn’t managed to organize around a single actor capable of transitioning the Iranian political system.

In other words, Donald Trump’s prediction hasn’t borne fruit. Why is that?

Reza Pahlavi represents one of the two main oppositional currents, supported by hardline exiled Iranians who want to see the return of the monarchy. But perhaps surprisingly, many other facets of Iranian society have been heard chanting Javid Shah (Long live the King) during the last couple of weeks, not just the usual monarchist suspects. This has been the case both in Iran itself during the mass-protests as well as in European cities where Iranian diasporas are present. These are laborers and students, white collar workers and low-income takers, et cetera. Those who long for the return of the shah belong not only to the fringes of society but also many groups in between.

Saeed Ghasseminejad, senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington D.C., explains that this widespread support should not necessarily be understood as a wish to go back to the oppressive system of the shahdom, which was overthrown in 1979 for that very reason. Rather, it is a response to the perceived incompetence of the current authoritarian rule. “The more the Islamic Republic has failed, the more it has emboldened its antithesis,” as he puts it.

Many of those who demand that Reza Pahlavi take over do so under the premise that he is to act only as a transitional figure after the fall of the Ayatollah. Reza Pahalavi is viewed as an arbitrator of order and competency, Ghasseminejad continues. He is one of few unifying oppositional leaders in the fight against the theocratic rule of the mullahs. Many of those who root for him may do so only temporarily and only for his perceived capacity to change the status quo.

Pahlavi himself claims to have a secular democracy in mind as an end goal for Iran. His role would merely be to monitor and sustain such a process. These statements seem to have helped his lobbying efforts in America and Israel. Many policymakers in both countries endorse him as head of a transitional government towards democracy – but not if he were to become a permanent despot, like his father before him. Whether or not Pahlavi intends to pursue this path or instead consolidates his own power – in a scenario where he emerges victorious in the war – remains to be seen. Critics have their doubts, which leads us to the other motley side of the opposition.

There are those who want an instant transformation into some sort of democracy, without having to depend on the successor of a previous authoritarian system. Up until the revolution in 1979 many of those who fought against the “peacock throne” (as it was called) did so because they, just like todays opposition, wanted a true democratic state. A republic.

And just like today, many people were willing to cooperate with fundamentally differing ideological actors in order to achieve that goal. Indeed, the 70’s in Iran saw unlikely alliances take shape between democratic and autocratic movements. Most conspicuous perhaps, was the support for the Shia clergy from left-leaning student groups and political organizations. The logic that my enemy’s enemy is my friend laid the foundation for the takeover of yet another, and according to many an even worse form of authoritarian governance.

Some anti-monarchists of the Iranian opposition see the same pattern emerge today in reverse, and fear the consequences of regime-change at any cost. According to this view, disturbing echoes from the past should work as a warning sign to those who want to put Pahlavi on the throne. To them, this chain of revolutionary mechanisms must be broken once and for all.

There is something to be said about these worries. Signs have emerged of radicalization within monarchist circles in Europe and America. The Guardian, for instance, has reported on pro-monarchists in London pressuring other dissidents into joining their cause. One noteworthy example of this is how small business owners have been coerced into displaying the sun-and-lion flag (a symbol of the shahdom) in front of their shops. Another example is monarchist harassment targeted against other oppositional voices online, as reported by Politico. These methods stand in stark contrast to the alleged democratic nature of Pahlavi’s movement.

But even among the anti-monarchists who lift these concerns of undemocratic tendencies, there are internal divisions. Some of these voices distance themselves from both the Islamic regime and the Shah because of their own supposed democratic convictions. A closer look at the largest organization of this non-monarchist oppositional strand raises some doubts, however. The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran is a dissident group combining elements of Shia Islam with revolutionary socialist ideals and has consistently aimed to abolish first the shahdom and then subsequently the ayatollah since the organization’s inception in 1965.

Much like the monarchists, the PMOI has largely worked outside of Iran after being banned by the regime in 1981. Unlike its two ideological rivals, the monarchists and the Ayatollahs, the PMOI has never ruled Iran. They did support Khomeini during the initial phases of the revolution in 1979 but soon became enemies and thus weren’t able to participate in the new government. This gives them leverage when arguing against the tyrannical nature of both previous regimes.

Their own methods, however, have been far from democratic. From cooperating with Khomeini during the revolution, to supporting Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war and being accused of numerous violent attacks against institutions with civilian casualties, the PMOI doesn’t seem to be more concerned with democracy than those whom they choose to criticize.

In the west, Reza Pahlavi is widely portrayed as the most suitable candidate for leading a post-war government. Many European and American politicians with varying political affiliations have been in contact with Pahlavi and in some cases even publicly endorsed him. But we as observers must also be vary of potential democratic backsliding within his movement.

Though Pahlavi himself probably understands the importance of having officially declared democratic goals to follow through on – if he is to continue to garner the vital support he needs from his contributors in Europe and America – the radical monarchists might demand even more from him. At the same time, a new government must take all sides of the present opposition into account if the intention is to build a stable and long-lasting democratic system.

As many scholars have argued, democratic change doesn’t come about automatically after removing the authoritarians in charge. It needs to be built from the ground up, taking different wills into consideration and making it worthwhile for political opponents to lay down their arms and solve problems through compromise and negotiation.

Since these obstacles for democracy remain unresolved however, Reza Pahlavi could be seen less as Iran’s coming savior and more as an unpredictable would-be ruler. Something paradoxical seems to surround his political persona. On the one hand, his entire political legacy stems from his claim to the throne which he feels entitled to, due to traditions of succession. Pahlavi praises the former glory of the monarchy and is reluctant to distance himself from his father’s reign and the CIA and MI6 involvement in overthrowing the democratically elected Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953, which paved the way for the Pahlavi dynasty.

On the other hand, he emphasizes the importance of democratic norms and creating a new Iran for all of its inhabitants. Like mentioned many times before in this article, Pahlavi doesn’t officially aspire to become a ruler for life. A cynical observer might come to the conclusion that these contradictions make him an opportunist, adjusting his agenda to whatever political wind which brings him closer to power.

Although statistics from unbiased sources inside Iran are hard to come by, the independent Netherlands based GAMAAN research institute has conducted several polls on Iranians political views. In 2024, they found that 26 percent of Iranians were in favor of a secular republic whilst 21 percent supported a monarchy. About 43 percent would accept a strong authoritarian leader if necessary, although the question didn’t specify in what political system.

These figures support the thesis that the Iranian opposition is fundamentally split. The only thing they seemed to agree upon was that they wanted to move away from the current system. An overwhelming majority, 70 percent, opposed the rule of the Islamic republic. These figures are from 2024 and might have changed in light of recent events, but they still give an indication of the lack of a unified opposition.

If Reza Pahlavi comes out of this war as the new leader of Iran, no one can for sure predict whether or not he will walk in his father’s footsteps by re-establishing a dictatorial monarchy or if he can actually manage to lead a transition to modern day democracy by putting old conflicts to rest and unite the common enemies of the current regime.