The Soviet-Afghan War and the Mothers Who Fought Back

The Soviet-Afghan War was launched to bolster Soviet “internationalist” efforts and to support a communist ally in the face of a U.S.-backed insurgency. While this war is often discussed in terms of its role in the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, one critical aspect remains largely overlooked: the experiences of Soviet women affected by this conflict. In particular, the combat and veteran experiences of the women who served as civilian support, as well as the development of one of the most powerful civil society organizations; the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers (CSM).

Throughout the course of the 1979-1989 Soviet invasion, the Soviet Union deployed 600,000 troops with at least 15,000 reported as killed, though these statistics remain uncertain due to the legacy of censorship within the Soviet Union regarding this conflict. Alongside the conscripted Soviet soldiers, approximately 20,000 Soviet women willingly went to Afghanistan to serve in civilian support staff roles. However, the contributions of these women were largely erased from official Soviet records. For example, the casualty rates of these 20,000 Soviet women remain unknown, as they were never included in the Soviet Union’s official casualty counts.

In addition to this erasure of the dead, female veterans within the Soviet Union were similarly rendered invisible. Both men and women returning from Afghanistan faced a hostile Soviet society, reeling from the disillusionment and failures of the “internationalist” justifications for the war. In 1995, a legislative ruling finally granted Soviet-Afghan war veterans access to state benefits, similar to those received by World War II veterans. Female veterans were however excluded. A 2006 Russian ruling further cemented this marginalization by declaring that civilians who had worked in Afghanistan were not entitled to war benefits. Despite continued advocacy, these women are still denied their rights.

During the war, the Soviet Union adopted a narrative that only a small number of soldiers had been sent to Afghanistan. This obstructive approach toward sharing information to the Soviet public had the effect of fueling negative stereotypes that Soviet women traveling there were essentially government-supplied prostitutes. Growing domestic opposition toward the war and the breakdown of Soviet moral justifications for intervention reinforced the perception of these “bad girls” as being driven solely by a desire for sex and money in Afghanistan.

The Soviet State did nothing to rectify these assumptions, thus becoming complicit in the creation of a hostile environment for the women who had chosen to participate in the war. The lack of official rhetoric from the state condemned this view of the women serving in military support roles, such as nurses, contributing to rampant sexual harassment within the Soviet military camps.

Despite championing women’s liberation as a cornerstone of Marxist-Leninist socialist ideology, the Soviet Union largely ignored the challenges faced by Soviet women in Afghanistan. In addition to enduring social stigmatization, Soviet women in Afghanistan struggled to receive basic support from the Soviet Union regarding feminine hygienic needs. Notably, the regime failed to adequately supply menstrual products or to pass governmental retributive policies to protect women from sexual harassment within Soviet military camps.

While the Soviet Union’s official motivation for the Afghan war was to support the advancement of the global socialist revolution, including the promotion of women’s equality, the failure to account for Soviet women’s needs illustrates the hypocrisy of the regime’s purported commitment to gender equality.  

Many Soviet women were injured during their time serving in Afghanistan, arising from both the poor conditions of camp life as well as from direct combat-related incidents such as landmines. Upon their return to the Soviet Union, these various medical complications and disabilities were largely classified by Soviet health authorities as “general illness”, refusing to acknowledge that they were attributable to the war. This had great socioeconomic implications, as the pensions and medical benefits received were significantly reduced compared to those awarded to recognized veterans, such as those who served in World War Two.

Compounding this veteran status erasure, women were also excluded from governmental studies on the detrimental health effects for individuals who had participated in the Soviet-Afghan war. The suppression of Soviet women’s experiences was so thorough that Soviet censorship prevented public discussion of their ordeals for years. It was only with the 1990 publication of Svetlana Alexievich’s critically acclaimed book Zinky Boys, featuring interviews with both male and female veterans, that some of their stories reached the Soviet public.

While female veterans struggled for recognition, the families of Soviet conscripts, particularly their mothers, found greater success in their activist efforts. In 1989, the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers (CSM) was founded by Maria Kirvasova, a member of the Kalmyk ethnic minority, who was joined by other early leaders who often came from similarly marginalized communities within the Soviet Union.

This was reflective of the disproportionate impact of military conscription on ethnic minority groups, a trend that has continued on to the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Initially, CSM’s efforts focused on the safe return of conscripted soldiers, and to prevent compulsory service in the future. These goals later expanded to encompass a wider anti-military stance with an emphasis on the discontinuation of “dedovshchina”; brutal hazing practices that result in the peace-time deaths and mutilations of conscripts. 

CSM had a significant role in exposing and publicizing “dedovshchina”, which undermined public opinion of the Soviet military. In early 1990 CSM publicized claims of approximately 15,000 non-combat deaths that occurred within the Soviet Armed forces between 1985-1989 noting that these incidents were actively being covered up by the authorities. In conjunction with the media attention, CSM also held mass demonstrations in Moscow and other cities.

CSM utilized gender norms present within Soviet society in its approach to protesting. Firstly, it relied on a strategy of nonviolence that was intertwined with the normative gender stereotypes present within Soviet society. This allowed CSM to exploit the moral weight and idealization of motherhood within Soviet society, particularly in their dealings with the largely male governmental and military representatives. 

CSM also deftly exploited the media by playing into gendered stereotypes to achieve its goals. In particular, CSM relied on a strategy of drawing awareness to its members’ identities as mothers, which was relatable to the general public. For example, CSM focused on framing their activism as the work of typical Russian mothers and Babushkas, bundled in wool coats and scarves, acting as representatives of middle-aged and elderly women living in any given Soviet city or village. Through this strategy of both nonviolence and image cultivation, and despite the radical nature of their anti-war activism within a highly militaristic society, CSM still “fit” within the traditional ideal of Soviet womanhood.

Ultimately, CSM managed to enact significant pressure upon the Soviet, and later Russian, government for legislative change. For example, in 1989 they halted the recruitment of higher education students, as well as managing to secure the return of 180,000 soldiers. Beyond showcasing the moral reprehensibility of the “dedovshchina” practice, it also served to demonstrate the incapability of the military in maintaining internal order, thus casting doubt on the general efficiency and defensive capability of the Soviet Union. Societal perceptions of military service and its necessary role in “making men out of boys” were also dramatically altered, increasingly justifying draft evasion and exacerbating the conscription crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

CSM’s impact on the Soviet and later Russian military landscape cannot be overstated. However, its trajectory has not been without controversy. Unlike many Western feminist movements, CSM never actively collaborated with international feminist organizations or framed its activism through a gendered lens. It focused on conscription and military abuse rather than broader issues such as conflict-related sexual violence or the experiences of displaced women in war zones. This approach remained consistent even decades later, including during Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, CSM evolved into a decentralized network of organizations. However, Russia’s 2014 “foreign agent” laws significantly hindered many of its branches, restricting their ability to operate. While some factions continue to advocate for anti-militarism and human rights, others have shifted in a different direction. Some CSM-affiliated groups now openly support the “traditional values” rhetoric used by President Vladimir Putin to justify Russian aggression. Initially one of the Soviet Union’s, and later the Russian Federation’s, strongest civil society movements against militarism has, in some cases, transformed into a tool for legitimizing these very forces.